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Science Made the Modern World, and it’s science that shapes modern culture. That’s
a sentiment that gained currency in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the
early twentieth century—a sentiment that seemed almost too obvious to articulate
then and whose obviousness has, if anything, become even more pronounced over
time. Science continues to Make the Modern World. Whatever names we want to give
to the leading edges of change—globalization, the networked society, the knowledge
economy—it’s science that’s understood to be their motive force. It’s science that
drives the economy and, more pervasively, it’s science that shapes our culture. We
think in scientiﬁc terms. To think any other way is to think inadequately, illegiti-
mately, nonsensically. In 1959, C. P. Snow’s Two Cultures and The Scientiﬁc Revolution
complained about the low standing of science in ofﬁcial culture, but he was presid-
ing not at a funeral but at a christening. In just that very broad sense, the “science
wars” have long been over and science is the winner.
In the 1870s, Andrew Dickson White, then president of Cornell, wrote about the
great warfare between science and what he called “dogmatic theology” that was being
inexorably won by science.
1 In 1918, Max Weber announced the “disenchantment of
the world,” conceding only that “certain big children” still harbored reservations
about the triumph of amoral science (Weber, [1919]1991: 142). Some years earlier,
writing from the University of Chicago, Thorstein Veblen described the essential mark
of modern civilization as its “matter of fact” character, its “hard headed apprehension
of facts.” “This characteristic of western civilization comes to a head in modern
science,” and it’s the possession of science that guarantees the triumph of the West
over “barbarism.” The scientist rules: “On any large question which is to be disposed
of for good and all the ﬁnal appeal is by common consent taken to the scientist. The
solution offered by the scientist is decisive,” unless it is superseded by new science.
“Modern common sense holds that the scientist’s answer is the only ultimately true
one.” It is matter-of-fact science that “gives tone” to modern culture (Veblen, 1906:
585–88). This is not an injunction about how modern people ought to think and speak
but Veblen’s description of how we do think and speak.
In 1925, Alfred North Whitehead’s Science and the Modern World introduced the 
historical episode that “made modernity,” which had not yet been baptized as “the
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race had yet encountered . . . Since a babe was born in a manger, it may be doubted
whether so great a thing has happened with so little stir.” What started as the pos-
session of an embattled few had reconstituted our collective view of the world and
the way to know it; the “growth of science has practically recoloured our mentality
so that modes of thought which in former times were exceptional, are now broadly
spread through the educated world.” Science “has altered the metaphysical pre-
suppositions and the imaginative contents of our minds . . .” Born in Europe in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, its home is now “the whole world.” Science, 
that is to say, travels with unique efﬁciency: it is “transferable from country to 
country, and from race to race, wherever there is a rational society” (Whitehead,
[1925]1946: 2).
The founder of the academic discipline called the history of science—Harvard’s
George Sarton—announced in 1936 that science was humankind’s only “truly cumu-
lative and progressive” activity, so if you wanted to understand progress towards
modernity, the history of science was the only place to look (Sarton, 1936: 5). The
great thing about scientiﬁc progress was—as was later said and often repeated—that
“the average college freshman knows more physics than Galileo knew . . . and more
too than Newton” (Gillispie, 1960: 9). Science, Sarton (1948: 55) wrote, “is the most
precious patrimony of mankind. It is immortal. It is inalienable.” When, toward the
middle of the just-past century, the Scientiﬁc Revolution was given its proper name,
it was, at the same time, pointed to as the moment modernity came to be. Listen to
Herbert Butterﬁeld in 1949, an English political historian, making his one foray into
the history of science:
[the scientiﬁc revolution] outshines everything [in history] since the rise of Christianity and
reduces the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes, mere internal displace-
ments, within the system of medieval Christendom. Since it changes the character of men’s habit-
ual mental operations even in the conduct of the non-material sciences, while transforming the
whole diagram of the physical universe and the very texture of human life itself, it looms . . .
large as the real origin of the modern world and of the modern mentality...(Butterﬁeld, 1949:
—viii)
Butterﬁeld’s formulation was soon echoed and endorsed, as in this example from the
Oxford historian of science A. C. Crombie:
The effects of the new science on life and thought have . . . been so great and special that the
Scientiﬁc Revolution has been compared in the history of civilisation to the rise of ancient Greek
philosophy in the 6
th and 5
th centuries B.C. and to the spread of Christianity throughout the
Roman Empire . . . (Crombie, [1952]1959: vol. 1, p. 7)
And by 1960 it had become a commonplace—Princeton historian Charles Gillispie
(1960: 8) concurring that modern science, originating in the seventeenth century, was
“the most . . . inﬂuential creation of the western mind.” As late as 1986, Richard West-
fall—then the dean of America’s historians of science—put science right at the heart
of the modern order: “For good and for ill, science stands at the center of every dimen-
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. . .” (Westfall, 1986).
Evidence of that contemporary inﬂuence and authority is all around us and is unde-
niable. In the academy, and most especially in the modern research university, it is
the natural sciences that have pride of place and the humanities and social sciences
that look on in envy and, sometimes, resentment. In academic culture generally, the
authority of the natural sciences is made manifest in the long-established desire of
many forms of inquiry to take their place among the “sciences”: social science, man-
agement science, domestic science, nutrition science, sexual science. Just because the
designation “science” is such a prize, more practices now represent themselves as sci-
entiﬁc than ever before. The homage is paid from the weak to the strong: students in
sociology, anthropology, and psychology commonly experience total immersion in
“methods” courses, and while chemists learn how to use mass spectrometers and
Bunsen burners, they are rarely exposed to courses in “scientiﬁc method.” The
strongest present-day redoubts of belief in the existence, coherence, and power of the
scientiﬁc method are found in the departments of human, not of natural, science.
Moreover, though it may be vulgar to mention such things, one index of the author-
ity of science in academic culture is the distribution of cash, a distribution that
seems—crudely but effectively—to reﬂect public sensibilities about which forms of
inquiry have real value and which do not. The National Science Foundation and the
National Institutes of Health distribute vastly more money to natural scientiﬁc
research than the National Endowment of the Humanities does to its constituents.
Statistics ﬁrmly establish pay differentials between academic natural scientists and
engineers and their colleagues in sociology and history departments, and the “summer
salary” instituted by the National Science Foundation early in its career was one
explicit means of ensuring this result in a Cold War era when the “scarcity” of physi-
cists and chemists, but not of, say, art historians, was a matter of political concern.
These days it is more likely the “opportunity cost” argument that justiﬁes this
outcome, even if it means that not just scientists and engineers but also academic
lawyers, physicians, economists, and business school professors now command higher
salaries.
2 Many scientists and engineers are now the apples of their administrators’
eyes because their work brings in government and corporate funding, with the atten-
dant overheads on which research universities now rely to pay their bills. Finally, the
ability of university administrators to advertise to their political masters how their
activities help “grow the local economy,” spinning off entrepreneurial companies,
transferring technology, and creating high-paid, high-tax jobs, all support the increas-
ing inﬂuence of science and engineering in the contemporary research university. In
the 1960s, social and cultural theorists—following Habermas—began to worry about
what they called a “technocracy,” in which decisions properly belonging in the public
sphere, to be taken by democratically elected and democratically accountable politi-
cians, were co-opted by a cadre of scientiﬁc and technical experts—as the saying is,
“on top” rather than “on tap.” Even though that worry seems to have been allayed
by more recent concern with political interference in scientiﬁc judgments, a recent
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autonomy of science blandly asserted the primacy of science as the leading force of
modern historical change: “Science largely dictated the political realities of the twen-
tieth century” (Specter, 2006: 61).
Sixty years after Hiroshima, and over a century after General Electric founded the
ﬁrst industrial research laboratory, it is almost too obvious to be pointed out that it is
the natural sciences that are now so closely integrated into the structures of power
and wealth, and not their poorer intellectual cousins. It is science that has the capac-
ity to deliver the goods wanted by the military and by industry, and not sociology or
history, though some obvious qualiﬁcations need to be made—not all the natural sci-
ences do this—and there was a period, early in the post–World War II world, when
there were visions of how the human sciences might make major contributions to
problems of conﬂict, deviance, strategic war-gaming, the rational conduct of military
operations and weapons development, and the global extension of benign American
power. Few observers disagree when it is said that science has changed much about
the way we live now and are likely to live in the future: how we communicate, how
long we are likely to live and how well, whether any of the crucial global problems
we now confront—from global warming to our ability to feed ourselves—are likely to
be solved—indeed, what it will mean to be human.
Some time about the middle of the just-past century, sociologists noted an expo-
nential increase in the size of the scientiﬁc enterprise. By any measure, almost every-
thing to do with science was burgeoning: in the early 1960s, it was said that 90 percent
of all the scientists who had ever lived were then alive and that a similar proportion
of all the scientiﬁc literature ever published had been published in the past decade.
Expenditures on scientiﬁc research were going up and up, and, if these trends con-
tinued—which in the nature of things they could not—every man, woman, child, and
dog in the United States would be a scientist and every dollar of the Gross Domestic
Product would be spent on the support of science (Price, [1963]1968: 19). By these
and many other measures, it makes excellent sense to observe that science is consti-
tutive of the Modern World. And so it’s hard to say that claims that Science either
Made the Modern World or that Science is constitutive of Modern Culture are either
nonsense or that they need massive qualiﬁcation. Nevertheless, unless we take a much
closer look at such claims, we will almost certainly fail to give any worthwhile account
of the Way We Live Now.
Do we live in a scientiﬁc world? Assuming that we could agree on what such a state-
ment might mean, there is quite a lot of evidence that we do not now and never have.
In 2003, a Harris poll revealed that 90 percent of American adults believe in God, a
belief that, of course, is not now, and never was, in any necessary conﬂict with what-
ever might be meant by a scientiﬁc mentality. But 82 percent believe in a physical
Heaven—a belief that is—perhaps predictably, just because Heaven is so much more
pleasant than The Other Place—13 percent more popular than a belief in Hell; 84
percent believe in the survival of an immaterial soul after death, and 51 percent in
the reality of ghosts. The triumph of science over religion trumpeted in the late nine-
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itual agencies could intervene in the course of nature, that is to say, whether such
things as miracles existed. By that criterion, 84 percent of American adults are
unmarked by the triumph of science over religion that supposedly happened over a
century ago. These responses are not quite the same thing as the “public ignorance of
science” (or “public misunderstanding of science”) so frequently bemoaned by leaders
of the scientiﬁc community. For that, you’ll want statistics on public beliefs about
things like species change or the Copernican system. Such ﬁgures are available: 57
percent of Americans say they believe in psychic phenomena, such as ESP and telepa-
thy, that cannot be explained by “normal means.”
3 Americans are often said to be
more credulous than Europeans, but comparative statistics point to a more patchy
state of affairs. Forty percent of Americans said astrology is “very” or “sort of” scien-
tiﬁc, while 53 percent of Europeans that it was “rather scientiﬁc.” Americans did some-
what better than Europeans in grasping that the Earth revolves around the Sun and
not the other way: 24 percent of Americans got that wrong compared with 32 percent
of Europeans, and only 48 percent of Americans believed that antibiotics killed viruses
compared with 59 percent of Europeans. Unsurprisingly, the “Darwin question” is
ﬂunked by more Americans than Europeans: 69 percent of Europeans, but only 52
percent of Americans, agreed that “Human beings developed from earlier species of
animals” (National Science Foundation, 2001; European Commission, 2001). A still
more recent transnational survey published in Science shows that, when asked the
same question, Americans yielded the second-lowest rate of acceptance (now 40
percent) of all 34 countries polled—above only Turkey (Miller et al., 2006). If you
believe the Gallup pollsters, then in 2005 the percentage of Americans who agreed
with the more speciﬁc and loaded statement that “Man has developed over millions
of years from less advanced forms of life [and] no God participated in this process”
was 12 percent, encouragingly up from 9 percent in 1999.
4
Whitehead’s Science and the Modern World was based on the Lowell Lectures given
at Harvard by a newly minted professor of philosophy, and perhaps that context is
relevant to his assertion that scientiﬁc modes of thought “are now broadly spread
through the educated world.” Perhaps we can conclude that there is now, just as there
always has been, a big gulf between “the educated world” and the unwashed and unlet-
tered. But Whitehead was quite aware that the Galilean-Newtonian “revolution” was
the possession of only a very small number of people and that their beliefs bore slight
relationship to those of the peasantry in Sussex, much less in Serbia or Siam. Although
a number of twentieth-century scholars loosely referred (and refer) to science-induced
tectonic and decisive shifts in “our” ways of thinking, or to those of “the West,” White-
head, addressing his Harvard audience, conﬁned himself to “the educated world.” So
it must, then, be relevant that the 84 percent of contemporary Americans who profess
belief in miracles does indeed drop when the responses of only those with postgradu-
ate degrees are considered, that is to say, not just who are college educated but have
master’s or doctoral degrees. The percentage of these elites who say they believe in mir-
acles is only 72 percent and the percentage of college graduates who agree with the
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remains that we can still make some distinction of the general sort that Whitehead
intended: suppose that “science” is what’s believed at Harvard and Haverford 
that’s not believed at, say, Oral Roberts. Maybe that’s right, but that’s not quite what
Whitehead said.
Perhaps, then, we should ﬁnd some statistics about what scientists believe. A survey
conducted in 1916 found that 40 percent of randomly selected American scientists
professed belief in a personal God. This was a surprise to the author of the report, and
he expressed his conﬁdence that the ﬁgure would surely drop as education spread
(Leuba, 1916). But it has not. In a survey published in Nature in 1997, an identical 40
percent of American scientists counted themselves as believers in God, with only 45
percent willing to say they did not believe (Radford, 2003; Larson & Witham, 1997).
Those wanting to get the ﬁgure of scientists believing in a personal God or human
immortality under 10 percent will have to accept a 1998 survey conﬁned to members
of the National Academy of Sciences, while the mathematicians among this elite were
the most likely to believe, at about 15 percent (Larson & Witham, 1998). Scientists,
of course, are leading the charge in the recent American defense of Darwinism in the
classroom, but according to the Gallup poll, only a bare majority of them—55
percent—actually assent to the poll’s version of Darwinian evolution.
5
There is no reason to fetishize a Harris, Gallup, or any other systematic attitude
survey. We do not know with any great speciﬁcity what people might mean when they
say they believe in miracles (or, indeed, astrology), and the inadequacy of any simple-
minded juxtaposition of “scientiﬁc” versus “fundamentalist” beliefs is indicated by
the soaring popularity of stem cell research, even among evangelical Christians who
are widely supposed to be against tampering with God-given human life. Religiosity
seems to bear on embryo destruction in abortion in a way it does not in stem cell
research.
6 And, if it were thought that religiosity translates into a “don’t mess with
God’s Nature” attitude, then Americans again are much more favorably disposed
towards genetically modiﬁed foods than are Western Europeans or Japanese.
7 The legal
scholar Ronald Dworkin has recently pointed out——without evidence, but plausibly
enough—that not a lot should be inferred about overall attitudes to scientiﬁc exper-
tise from evangelicals’ doubts about Darwinism:
Almost all religious conservatives accept that the methods of empirical science are in general
well designed for the discovery of truth . . . They would not countenance requiring or permitting
teachers to teach, even as an alternate theory, what science has established as unquestionably
and beyond challenge false: that the sun orbits the earth or that radioactivity is harmless, for
example”
8 (Dworkin, 2006: 24).
But it still seems safe to say that the great majority of the people professing belief in
things like miracles have been presented with multiple articulations of what it might
mean to “think scientiﬁcally” and that thinking that miracles happen is understood
not to be part of the scientiﬁc game.
9 Quite a lot of the people saying they believe in
miracles, like quite a lot of the people saying that human beings were specially created
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eye of scientiﬁc authority. And so one thing we cannot sensibly mean when we say
that we live in a Scientiﬁc Age or that Science Made the Modern World is that scien-
tiﬁc beliefs have got much grip on the modern mind writ large. That just isn’t true.
Maybe, if we mean anything legitimate at all by saying such things, we mean that the
Idea of Science is widely held in respect. That seems plausible enough. Consider the
litany of complaints from high scientiﬁc places about “public ignorance of science”—
complaints that often are inspired by such statistics as those just cited. Such com-
plaints can actually help establish the esteem in which science is held in our culture.
It’s been some time since I heard anyone gain a public platform for complaining about
“public ignorance of sociological theory” or “public ignorance of the novels of Mrs.
Gaskell.” Nor do ofﬁcial worries about the proliferation of pseudo-science or junk
science necessarily bear on the authority of science. Consider present-day concerns
over “Intelligent Design” and “Creation Science,” but note that these represent them-
selves as forms of science, not as nonscience or as antiscience. Advocates of Intelli-
gent Design want it taught in science classrooms. From a pertinent perspective, the
problem today is not antiscience but a contest for the proper winner of the designa-
tion “science.” That’s a sign that the label “science” is a prize very much worth having.
A writer in The New York Times (Holt, 2005), referring to the apparent upsurge in evan-
gelical Christianity, recently announced that “Americans on the whole do not seem
to care greatly for science,” but such conclusions are not well grounded. American
faith in the power of science—or, more accurately, of science and technology—has
been, and continues to be, enormous. In the late 1950s, surveys showed that a remark-
able 83 percent of the U.S. public reckoned that the world was “better off” because of
science and only a negligible 2 percent thought it was “worse off” (Whithey, 1959).
10
Amid anxieties about “increasing public skepticism toward science,” various surveys
conducted in the 1970s—phrasing their questions somewhat differently—purported
to ﬁnd a decline in approval (to between 71 and 75 percent, with a negative assess-
ment rising to between 5 and 7 percent)—though few other modern American insti-
tutions could hope to come close to that level of public favor (Pion & Lipsey, 1981:
304, table 1).
11 In the most recent survey, Americans expressed a “great deal” of con-
ﬁdence (42 percent) in the scientiﬁc community and signiﬁcantly less in the banking
system (29 percent), the presidency (22 percent), and, tellingly, organized religion (24
percent).
12 The Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project discovered that 19
percent of Americans surveyed recently accounted “Science/Technology” to be the
“greatest achievement” of the U.S. government during the course of the twentieth
century—more than twice as many as those who pointed to civil rights and more than
three times as many as those giving the prize to the social security system. In the
public mind, science and technology are endowed with colossal power: about 80
percent of Americans think that within the next ﬁfty years science will (“probably/
deﬁnitely”) deliver cures for cancer and AIDS and will “improve [the] environment,”
compared with just 44 percent who believe that Jesus Christ will reappear on Earth
during that period (Kohut & Stokes, 2006: 60, 86).
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at Harvard—are not very widely distributed in modern culture. This means that the
authority of science—the sense that we live in a scientiﬁc age—has to reside in some-
thing other than the widespread understanding of particular scientiﬁc facts or theories,
no matter how important, foundational, or elementary they may be. This would be
quite a concession in itself, and we should reﬂect a lot more on what it means. But
can’t we nevertheless say that the authority and inﬂuence of science reside in some-
thing other than shared beliefs, something that nevertheless “belongs to” science?
Consider, again, the notion of the Idea of Science. I’ve given some reasons to think
that the Idea of Science confers authority, even if a range of speciﬁc scientiﬁc beliefs
do not. What might be meant by the Idea of Science? There are difﬁculties in saying
much about such an Idea. If we want to talk about the Idea of Science apart from spe-
ciﬁc beliefs, then we probably are pointing at some notion of scientiﬁc method. Sci-
entists—and, more importantly, philosophers of science—have been identifying,
celebrating, and propagating the scientiﬁc method for a long time—arguably at least
as far back as the time of Descartes, Newton, and Boyle. It’s that universal, rational,
and effective method which has been said to account for the power of science and to
mark it out from other modes of inquiry lacking such a method. As the recent New
Yorker piece announced, “The scientiﬁc method has come to shape our notion of
progress and of modern life” (Specter, 2006: 61).
The problem is that there is not now, and never has been, a consensus about what
such a method is.
13 The ﬁrst two entries for “scientiﬁc method” that Google gave me
opted for observation before the formulation of an explanatory hypothesis, followed
by experimental tests of the hypothesis, though that account excludes all those sci-
ences which are not experimental, for example, geology, meteorology, and many forms
of evolutionary biology.
14 The current Wikipedia entry makes reference to the views
of Thomas Kuhn, who, like Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, and Paul Feyerabend, famously
doubted whether theory-free observation ever occurred. Science magazine has usefully
addressed the question by annotating a number of scientiﬁc papers to show the sci-
entiﬁc method at work.
15 A “pragmatical scheme” of that seven-step method is pro-
vided, starting with “deﬁne the question,” going through “analyze the data,” and
concluding with “publish results,” but it’s hard to look at this list without conclud-
ing that—”perform experiment” apart—its directions can be found in any kind of sys-
tematic inquiry pretending to rigor, and not just in science.
16 Other entries early in
the Google list give deductive, rather than inductive, inference pride of place and omit
references to experiment.
17 Some make reference to “proof” or “conﬁrmation” of a
hypothesis; others point out—following Popper—that one can never prove but only
disprove the validity of a hypothesis. Few bother to cite T. H. Huxley’s ([1854]1900:
45) view that science is “nothing but trained and organised common sense” or that
of the Nobel Prize–winning immunologist Peter Medawar (1967: 132) that “The sci-
entiﬁc method does not exist.”
In fact, if the authority of science—the way in which it is supposed to mark moder-
nity—resides in some idea of scientiﬁc method, that would be as much as saying not
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of philosophy of science was the most authoritative form of modern culture. Somehow
that doesn’t seem right. The authority of philosophers in our culture doesn’t come
close to the authority of scientists. Much the same sort of argument, I think, applies
to any Idea of Science that ﬂows from identifying shared conceptual content. The Unity
of Science movement of the early and middle part of the twentieth century arose out
of a worry that, while science must, of course, be conceptually uniﬁed, no one had yet
deﬁnitively shown what the basis of that unity was. That situation has not changed,
and although scientists these days seem not to be much worried about “unity,”
leading-edge philosophers of science are now increasingly writing books and papers
taking the “disunity” of science as their subject (e.g., Dupré, 1993; Rosenberg, 1994;
Cartwright, 1999; Galison & Stump, 1996).
I doubt that searching for some stable and plausible Idea of Science is going to get
us very far in trying to describe the authority of science in the modern world, or in
showing that science does have such authority. But, if I’m right, we’re beginning to
see the shape of a real problem: science, we say, marks modernity—it enjoys unique
authority—but that authority does not seem to consist either in lay possession of any
speciﬁc set of scientiﬁc beliefs—no matter how elementary or fundamental—nor in
any stable sense of the method scientists supposedly used to guarantee the power of
their knowledge. Should we just agree that science has very little to do with Modern
Culture—bizarre as that might sound—or that the authority of science resides in some-
thing besides knowledge of its beliefs or methods?
It seems that if we want to talk about the authority of science in the Modern World,
we can’t sensibly talk about our culture’s knowledge of scientiﬁc beliefs or our grasp
of some notion of Method. What seems to be essential is not knowing science but
knowing where to look for it, knowing who are the relevant authorities, knowing that
we can and should assent to what they said, that we can and should trust them in
their proper domains. Pragmatically, there’s a lot to recommend this state of affairs:
it’s unfortunate that the ideas of both Darwinian evolution and the heliocentric
system have not taken better root in our culture, but, in general, no one can know very
much of science, and so knowing who the relevant experts are is sufﬁcient in the great
majority of cases. This applies to scientists as well as the laity: even plant physiolo-
gists are likely to have a deﬁcient knowledge of astrophysics, and a cardiologist is going
to go to a neurologist if she has persistent headaches. Expertise isn’t considered to be
fungible: it comes in various special ﬂavors. And so knowing where to look for 
the relevant experts has to involve some notion of relevant expertise, of relevant
authority.
When we say that our task is recognizing the experts in their proper domains, what
are those domains? Putting the question that way identiﬁes a sense in which scien-
tiﬁc authority is now not greater but clearly much less than it once was. Consider what
philosophers—following G. E. Moore in the ﬁrst years of the twentieth century—call
“the Naturalistic Fallacy.” That fallacy is believing something that is impossible,
moving logically from an “is-statement”—a description of how things are in the
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way, science is one thing, morality another; and you should not think of deducing
what’s good from what is. But the Naturalistic Fallacy is not just about a philosopher’s
boundary; during the course of the twentieth century, very many scientists publicly
insisted that they possessed no special moral authority and that questions of what
ought to be done—for example, about the consequences of their own work—were not
their preserve. As Edward Teller (1950) put it, it was the scientist’s job to discover the
laws of nature, not to pronounce on whether the laws permitting nuclear fusion ought
to be mobilized for the construction of a hydrogen bomb. You would think that
Oppenheimer would have disagreed with such a sentiment, but on this point he was
at one with Teller (see, for example, Oppenheimer, 1965: 272).
Scientists—it was widely insisted by modern scientists themselves—possessed no
particular moral authority. It was once assumed they did; now it was not. If moral
authority is what you want, you should go to some other sort of person, and that’s
why the late Stephen Jay Gould (1997) referred to science and religion as “non-
overlapping magisteria.” That division of labor between natural experts and ethical
experts is now institutionalized, accepted almost as a matter of course. Yet it leads to
a pervasive awkwardness in contemporary culture. Just as so many social and politi-
cal decisions increasingly come to draw on massive amounts of specialized expertise—
even to understand what they’re about—so it is accepted that those who know most
should accept radical restrictions on having consequential opinions about what ought
to be done. Here, the up-curve of the reach of science in our social and political life
meets the down-curve of scientists’ acknowledged moral authority. Who are they, such
that we can trust them—not just to know more about their specialized bits of the
world but to do the right thing?
“The scientist is not a priest.” That’s another way of identifying the limited author-
ity of the modern scientist, and the nonpriestly status of the scientist was much
insisted on throughout the twentieth century by scientists themselves. At the same
time, and perhaps responding to what was seen as the increasing cultural authority of
science during the course of the century, the scientiﬁc community was accused of
becoming “the new priesthood” and scientists as “the new brahmins” (e.g., Lapp,
1965; Klaw, 1968). An essay in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists about immediate
postwar Congressional engagements with science noted that, after Hiroshima,
[S]cientists became charismatic ﬁgures of a new era, if not a new world, in which science was
the new religion and scientists the new prophets . . . Scientists appeared to [politicians] as supe-
rior beings who had gone far ahead of the rest of the human race in knowledge and power . . .
Congressmen perceived scientists as being in touch with a supernatural world of mysterious and
awesome forces whose terrible power they alone could control. Their exclusive knowledge set
scientists apart and made them tower far above other men (quoted in Hall, [1956]1962: 270–72).
It’s a tension that remains unresolved: science is our most powerful form of knowl-
edge; it’s scientists—or at least those pretending to be scientists—that are turned to
when we want an account of how matters stand in the natural world. But, however
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those decisions—and there are an increasing number of them that are potentially
world-changing—it’s politics as usual.
Knowing where to look for the relevant experts also involves some notion of what
it is they know. In the early modern period, a common cultural distinction was made
between mathematics and natural philosophy. Philosophy was understood as the
search for Truth, for the realities behind appearances, for the real causal structure of
the world. Mathematics, by contrast, was taken as the quest for regular patterns of
natural relationships, such that you could use the resulting knowledge to predict and
control, without necessarily taking a bet on what the world was really like. Coperni-
cus was acting as a mathematician when he stipulated that the heliocentric system
was to be regarded as a predictive tool, and Galileo was blurring the boundaries
between mathematics and philosophy when he deﬁed the Vatican in asserting the
physical reality of Copernicanism.
18 I mention this old chestnut, just because it may
have signiﬁcance for our current problem of identifying who the relevant experts are.
At least from the early twentieth century, very many scientists—physicists, of course,
but not just physicists—publicly asserted that they were not, so to speak, in the Truth
Business.
19 Their task, it was insisted, was not metaphysics; it was not discovering ulti-
mate realities. It was, rather, ﬁnding out what “works”: what picture of nature was
maximally coherent, with existing theories and evidence, and what picture of nature
would allow scientists most powerfully to predict and control. Pragmatism was one
version of such a sensibility, but so were those positions called operationalism, con-
ventionalism, and phenomenalism. In 1899, the Johns Hopkins physicist Henry
Rowland (1899: 13), making no allusions to pragmatism or to any other formal phi-
losophy of science, explicitly contrasted the scientiﬁc with the “vulgar” or “ordinary
crude” mind: the scientist alone properly appreciated that “There is no such thing as
absolute truth and absolute falsehood.”
20 By the 1920s, Albert Einstein ([1929]1954)
was reminding the general reader that “It is difﬁcult even to attach a precise meaning
to the term ‘scientiﬁc truth,’” its semantics varying radically according to context of
use.
20 And C. P. Snow (1961: 257) surely spoke for most scientists when he bump-
tiously stipulated that “By truth, I don’t intend anything complicated ...I  a m  using
the word as a scientist uses it. We all know that the philosophical examination of the
concept of empirical truth gets us into some curious complexities, but most scientists
really don’t care.” The scientist was properly to be understood not on the model of
the philosopher but on the model of the engineer and technician. Our culture used
to insist on massive differences between science and technology and between the role
of the scientist and that of the engineer. It’s a distinction that now makes less and less
sense: we’re all engineers now, and the authority of science is increasingly based not
on what scientists know but on what they can help make happen. It’s a distinction
that increasingly resonates in the public culture: an NSF survey in 1976 revealed that
government funding of science was overwhelmingly popular but that only 9 percent
of the respondents wanted any of their tax dollars used to support basic research (Pion
& Lipsey, 1981: 308 [table IV] and 309).
Science and the Modern World 443
O
HTN18  5/21/07  10:30 AM  Page 443What difference does it make to the public authority of science if scientiﬁc knowl-
edge is just what works and if the scientist is understood as an aid to the technolo-
gist? First, at one time it was believed that a world saturated with technology would
not only be a modernized world but a secularized world. That turned out to be spec-
tacularly untrue. The mere presence of advanced technology in a society seems to have
little or nothing to do with how people think and what they value: some of the world’s
Web wizards are jihadis, and there seems to be no conﬂict between computer skill and
religious fundamentalism. We should be clear about another thing: engineers seem to
include as many morally admirable people as any other group of professionals; some
are more admirable than some scientists I know. But it’s the institutions we’re talking
about here, and what virtues and authority are associated with the institutions. The
technologist supplies what society wants; the scientist used to give society what it
didn’t know it wanted. That’s a simpliﬁcation, but, I think, a useful one: corporations,
governments, and the military enlist experts in the natural world overwhelmingly on
the condition that they can assist them in achieving useful goals—wealth, health, and
power. During the course of the twentieth century, the enterprise called science was
effectively enfolded in the institutions dedicated to the production of wealth and the
projection of power. That’s where we started, and that’s one way of describing 
the success of science in modernity. But one of the conditions of that success is, at
the same time, a problem for the authority of science in the modern world.
Modern scientists are not priests. Their expertises are not fungible—either one form
of technical expertise into another or technical expertise into moral authority. What
the modern scientist may have left as a basis of authority is a kind of independence
and a resulting notion of integrity. Yet the enfolding of science into the institutions
of wealth-making and power-projecting makes that independence harder to recognize
and acknowledge. And when scientiﬁc knowledge becomes patentable property, then
the independence of science from civic institutions becomes ﬁnally invisible. We’ve
gone some way in these directions—but not yet all the way, so it’s not a bad moment
to reﬂect on where we’ve come from and where we might be going.
I started by recalling how easy it once was to talk about science as an independent
cause of modernity, as modernity’s characteristic form of culture and as its distinct
master authority. It’s not so easy now. And one reason it’s not so easy is that our ability
to recognize relevant experts, and to recognize their independent authority, is harder
and harder to do. The success of science has created its successor problem. That
problem—the problem of the independent authority of science in our modern world—
may be a problem for science, but, more importantly, it’s a problem in our modern
order of things. The place of science in the modern world is just the problem of describ-
ing the way we live now: what to believe, whom to trust, what to do.
Notes
1. White (1876), and then developed as White (1896). White was following in the tradition of John
William Draper, whose History of the Conﬂict Between Religion and Science (1874) similarly announced
the inevitable triumph of science over religion.
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HTN18  5/21/07  10:30 AM  Page 4442. See, for example, Hollinger (2000).
3. Available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/04/29/opinion/polls/main507515.shtml.
4. Available at: http://www.pollingreport.com/science.htm and http://www.unl.edu/rhames/courses/
current/creation/evol-poll.htm.
5. Available at: http://www.religioustolerance.org/ev_publi.htm. (These ﬁgures are from a poll con-
ducted in November 1991.)
6. According to Kohut & Stokes (2006: 61), “In 2004, by a 52 percent to 34 percent margin, Americans
said it was more important to conduct such research, which might result in new cures for human 
diseases, than to avoid destroying the potential life of embryos. Two years earlier, only a plurality of
Americans supported stem-cell research (43 percent in favor to 38 percent against).”
7. Available at: http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=66.
8. We can set aside without comment, as an instance of a lawyer’s scientiﬁc naivete, the fact that much
radioactivity is indeed “harmless.”
9. See, e.g., Turner (1974).
10. Etzioni and Nunn (1974) argue convincingly that the public mind makes little, if any, distinction
between science and technology.
11. The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) has compiled time-series data on public conﬁdence
in various institutions. The data show a decline in conﬁdence in science from the early 1960s to the
late 1970s, but this follows a drop in conﬁdence for all major public institutions, and the decline for
science was notably less than it was for others (Pion & Lipsey, 1981: 307).
12. Figures quoted in Holt (2005: 25), from an NORC survey conducted between August 2004 and
January 2005.
13. See, for example, Shapin (2001).
14. Available at: http://teacher.pas.rochester.edu/phy_labs/AppendixE/AppendixE.html and http://
physics.ucr.edu/~wudka/Physics7/Notes_www/node5.html.
15. For example, available at: http://www.sciencemag.org/feature/data/scope/keystone1/.
16. “1. Deﬁne the question; 2. Gather information and resources; 3. Form hypothesis; 4. Perform 
experiment and collect data; 5. Analyze data; 6. Interpret data and draw conclusions that serve as a
starting point for new hypotheses; 7. Publish results.” Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Scientiﬁc_method.
17. Available at: http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/Education/EDF600/Mod3/sld001.htm.
18. See, for example, Dear (1995); Westman (1980).
19. The material in this and the next several paragraphs is included in Shapin (forthcoming: chapters
2–3).
20. For a pertinent Hopkins context to Rowland’s remarks, see Feldman and Desrochers (2004: 117–18).
21. For Einstein’s early operationalism, inﬂuenced by Mach, see Holton (1972).
References
Butterﬁeld, Herbert (1949) The Origins of Modern Science, 1300–1800. (London: G. Bell).
Cartwright, Nancy (1999) The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Science and the Modern World 445
O
HTN18  5/21/07  10:30 AM  Page 445Crombie, A. C. ([1952]1959) Medieval and Early Modern Science, 2 vols., revised 2nd ed. (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday Anchor Books).
Dear, Peter (1995) Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientiﬁc Revolution (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press).
Draper, John William (1874) History of the Conﬂict Between Religion and Science (New York: D. Appleton).
Dworkin, Ronald (2006) “Three Questions for America,” New York Review of Books 53(14): 24–30.
Dupré, John (1993) The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press).
Einstein, Albert ([1929]1954) “Scientiﬁc Truth” in Ideas and Opinions (New York: Crown Publishers):
261–2.
Etzioni, Amitai & Clyde Nunn (1974) “The Public Appreciation of Science in Contemporary America,”
Daedalus 103(3): 191–205.
European Commission (2001) “Europeans, Science and Technology” (Eurobarometer 55.2, December).
Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/ebs_154_en.pdf.
Feldman, Maryann & Pierre Desrochers (2004) “Truth for Its Own Sake: Academic Culture and Tech-
nology Transfer at Johns Hopkins University,” Minerva 42: 105–26.
Galison, Peter & David J. Stump (eds) (1996) The Disunity of Science: Boundaries, Contexts, and Power
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
Gillispie, Charles Coulston (1960) The Edge of Objectivity: An Essay in the History of Scientiﬁc Ideas
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Gould, Stephen Jay (1997) “Nonoverlapping Magisteria—Evolution versus Creationism,” Natural History
106(2): 16–25.
Hall, Henry S. ([1956]1962) “Scientists and Politicians,” in Bernard Barber and Walter Hirsch (eds), The
Sociology of Science (New York: Free Press; orig. publ. in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists [February 1956]:
269–87).
Hollinger, David A. (2000) “Money and Academic Freedom a Half-Century after McCarthyism: Uni-
versities and the Force Fields of Capital,” in Peggie J. Hollingsworth (ed), Unfettered Expression: Freedom
in American Intellectual Life (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press): 161–84.
Holt, Jim (2005) “Madness About a Method: How Did Science Become So Contentious and Politicized?”
New York Times Magazine (December 11): 25, 28.
Holton, Gerald (1972) “Mach, Einstein, and the Search for Reality,” in G. Holton (ed), The Twentieth-
Century Sciences: Studies in the Biography of Ideas (New York: Norton): 344–81.
Huxley, Thomas Henry ([1854]1900) “On the Educational Value of the Natural History Sciences,” in
Collected Essays, vol. III, Science and Education: Essays (New York: D. Appleton): 38–65.
Klaw, Spencer (1968) The New Brahmins: Scientiﬁc Life in America (New York: William Morrow).
Kohut, Andrew & Bruce Stokes (2006) America Against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are
Disliked (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt).
Lapp, Ralph E. (1965) The New Priesthood: The Scientiﬁc Elite and the Uses of Power (New York: Harper &
Row).
Larson, Edward J. & Larry Witham (1997) “Scientists Are Still Keeping the Faith,” Nature 386: 435–36.
Larson, Edward J. & Larry Witham (1998) “Leading Scientists Still Reject God,” Nature 394: 313.
446 Steven Shapin
O
HTN18  5/21/07  10:30 AM  Page 446Leuba, J. H. (1916) The Belief in God and Immortality: A Psychological, Anthropological and Statistical Survey
(Boston: Sherman, French).
Medawar, Peter B. (1967) The Art of the Soluble (London: Methuen).
Miller, Jon D., Eugenie C. Scott, & Shinji Okamoto (2006) “Public Acceptance of Evolution,” Science
313(5788): 765–6.
National Science Foundation (2001) Survey of Public Attitudes toward and Understanding of Science and
Technology, 2001, Division of Science Resources Statistics. Available at: http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/
seind04/c7/ﬁg07-06.htm.
Oppenheimer, J. Robert (1965) “Communication and Comprehension of Scientiﬁc Knowledge,” in
Melvin Calvin et al. (eds), The Scientiﬁc Endeavor: Centennial Celebration of the National Academy of Sci-
ences (New York: Rockefeller University Press): 271–9.
Pion, Georgine M. & Mark W. Lipsey (1981) “Public Attitudes toward Science and Technology: What
Have the Surveys Told Us?” Public Opinion Quarterly 45: 303–16.
Price, Derek J. deSolla ([1963]1968) Little Science, Big Science (New York: Columbia University Press,
1968).
Radford, Tim (2003) “‘Science Cannot Provide All the Answers’: Why Do So Many Scientists Believe in
God?”  Guardian (London, September 4). Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/life/feature/story/
0,13026,1034872,00.html.
Rowland, Henry A. (1899) “The Highest Aim of the Physicist,” Presidential Address Delivered at the
Second Meeting of the American Physical Society, October 28, 1899, Bulletin of the American Physical
Society 1: 4–16; Science 10(258): 825–33.
Rosenberg, Alexander (1994) Instrumental Biology, or the Disunity of Science (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press).
Sarton, George (1936) The Study of the History of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Sarton, George (1948) “The History of Science,” in The Life of Science: Essays in the History of Civiliza-
tion (New York: Henry Schuman): 29–58.
Shapin, Steven (2001) “How to Be Antiscientiﬁc,” in Jay A. Labinger & Harry Collins (eds), The One
Culture? A Conversation about Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 99–115.
Shapin, Steven (forthcoming) Science as a Vocation: Scientiﬁc Authority and Personal Virtue in Late 
Modernity.
Snow, C. P. (1959) The Two Cultures and the Scientiﬁc Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Snow, C. P. (1961) “The Moral Un-neutrality of Science,” Science 133(3448): 256–9.
Specter, Michael (2006) “Political Science: The Bush Administration’s War on the Laboratory,” New
Yorker (13 March): 58–69.
Teller, Edward (1950) “Back to the Laboratories,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 6(3): 71–2.
Turner, Frank M. (1974) “Rainfall, Plagues, and the Prince of Wales: A Chapter in the Conﬂict of Science
and Religion,” Journal of British Studies 13: 46–65.
Veblen, Thorstein (1906) “The Place of Science in Modern Civilization,” American Journal of Sociology
11: 585–609.
Weber, Max ([1919]1991) “Science as a Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (trans. and eds),
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (orig. publ. from a 1918 speech) (London: Routledge): 129–56.
Science and the Modern World 447
O
HTN18  5/21/07  10:30 AM  Page 447Westfall, Richard S. (1986) “The Scientiﬁc Revolution,” History of Science Society Newsletter 15(3). Avail-
able at: http://www.clas.uﬂ.edu/users/rhatch/pages/03-Sci-Rev/SCI-REV-Home/05-RSW-Sci-Rev.htm.
Westman, Robert S. (1980) “The Astronomer’s Role in the Sixteenth Century: A Preliminary Study,”
History of Science 18: 105–47.
White, Andrew Dickson (1876) The Warfare of Science (New York: D. Appleton).
White, Andrew Dickson (1896) A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, 2 vols
(New York: D. Appleton).
Whitehead, A. N. ([1925]1946) Science and the Modern World: Lowell Lectures (London: Scientiﬁc Book
Club).
Withey, Stephen B. (1959) “Public Opinion about Science and Scientists,” Public Opinion Quarterly 23:
382–8.
448 Steven Shapin
O
HTN18  5/21/07  10:30 AM  Page 448